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AN ALTERNATIVE CONSUMER COMPLAINT
AGAINST FREQUENT FLYER PROGRAMS
AFTER AMERICAN AIRLINES, 1NC. v. WOLENS
115 S. Ct. 817 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
You have worked for a number of years to build up those "frequent
flyer" miles on your favorite airline. You resisted the urge to cash them
in earlier because you wanted to hold out for your dream vacation to
Europe.' When you traveled on a business trip or holiday, you stayed
with your carrier2 to rack up more miles. You realize that there are
some rules with the frequent flyer programs, but you have never read the
fifty or more pages of minuscule type.
Now is the big day. You have two weeks off in August. You call
your carrier to cash in your miles and get the "Award Ticket" you have
earned. But, after five minutes of phone mail navigation and ten minutes
on hold, the friendly agent on the other end says, "I'm sorry we've
changed that program: You need 15,000 more miles for that trip"; or
"Your miles have expired because you didn't use them within two
!. This introduction is loosely based on an introduction appearing in Katherine A.
Braden, Frequent Flyer Coupon Brokering: A Valid Trade?, 55 J. ArR. L. & COM. 727
(1990).
2. For the purpose of this Note, the terms "carrier" and "airline" are used interchange-
ably.
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years"; or, "The month of August is blacked-out." In the worst-case
scenario, the agent says, "I'm sorry. We have discontinued that
program."
Frequent flyer programs (FFPs) emerged from the atmosphere of
freedom created by the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978.?
The first FFP began in 1981 as a short-term promotion to capture more
business travelers.4 Shortly thereafter, every airline in America had a
similar program or was affiliated with one.5 Ten years later, twenty-
eight million people were members of at least one program.6 For the
airline companies, the FFPs had become "important keys to competitive
viability."'7 Despite the flying public's overwhelming acceptance of
3. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.). See generally Russell A.
Klingaman, Predatory Pricing and Other Exclusionary Conduct in the Airline Industry:
Is Antitrust Law the Solution?, 4 DFPAuL Bus. L.J. 281, 282-84 (1992) (outlining the
climate of the deregulated airline industry).
Congress re-enacted Title 49 of the United States Code in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-272,
108 Stat. 745 (1994). Presently, the ADA is codified at various sections of 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 40101-49105. Congress intended to make no "substantive change" to the Title. § 1(a),
108 Stat. 745. This Note will follow the Supreme Court's method of citation and refer to
the pre-revision section numbers (i.e., 49 U.S.C. app. (1988)). See American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 828 n.1 (1995).
4. See Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 414 (1987) (noting that American
Airlines (American) was the first carrier to offer an FFP, but incorrectly identifying the
starting date as 1980); Travel/Aviation Editor, PR NEWSWIRE, May 1, 1981, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (American Airlines press release about FFP)
[hereinafter American-PR 5/1/81].
5. Levine, supra note 4, at 414. The other airlines reacted immediately to American's
move. United Airlines (United) introduced the second FFP only five days after
American's announcement. See Travel/Aviation Editor, PR NEWSWIRE, May 6, 1981,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (announcing United's new FFP)
[hereinafter United-PR 51618 1]. Other airlines also quickly followed. See Travel/Aviation
Editor, PR NEWSWIRE, May 11, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
(announcing TWA's new FFP) hereinafter TWA-PR 5/11/81]; Travel/Aviation Editor, PR
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 4, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (announcing
Delta's new FFP which based credit on flight segments) [hereinafter Delta-PR 8/4/81].
Within five months of American's introduction of the FFP, the airline industry supported
at least 10 separate programs. See Carole Shifrin, Rewarding Frequent Flyers: The Ins
& Outs of Airline Bonuses, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1981, at El.
6. Charles Lockwood, How to Manage Your Frequent Flyer Programs, S.F.
EXAMINER, Jan. 15, 1995, at T3. By the end of 1994, total FFP membership had grown
to 32 million members. Id.
7. Levine, supra note 4, at 414.
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these programs, courts are still struggling to define the scope of the
relationship among the airlines, FFPs, and passengers!
On February 1, 1995, most major American airlines raised the
amount of credits or "miles" an FFP member needs to receive a free
ticket.'0 This change "devalued" members' credit anywhere from
seventeen to fifty percent." A similar "restructuring" in 1988 resulted
in a number of class action lawsuits by consumers who felt cheated by
the unexpected changes. 2  Those actions are not yet settled.' 3 In fact,
only thirteen days before the carriers enacted the 1995 restructuring, the
8. The confusion was immediate. See Paul Grimes, Practical Traveler: Coupons and
Other Bonuses for the Airborne, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1981, § 10, at 3 (noting in a dated
reference that FFPs "seem as confusing and as complicated as Rubik's cube"); Eugene J.
McCarthy, From Here to Perplexity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1982, § 10, at 17 (noting that
FFPs are so confusing that it is easier not to use them). Consumer confusion continues
today. See, e.g., How Frequent Fliers Can Beat the Clock, Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1995, at
104 (noting passengers' perplexity with recent FFP changes and developments) [hereinafter
Beat the Clock].
9. While the type of FFP credit differs by airline, the most common is "miles."
Generally, the FFP awards one credit "mile" for every mile flown over a certain minimum
distance. Flights under the minimum distance receive a set amount, usually 500 miles.
See various FFPs' program rules (on file with author). Some airlines, most prominently
Southwest Airlines, award one credit for each "segment" flown. Early programs were
divided between mileage programs, segment programs, point programs, and direct cash
rebates. See Shiftin, supra note 5. This Note will use the terms "credit" and "miles"
interchangeably.
10. See Beat the Clock, supra note 8, at 104. Alaska, American, American West,
Continental, Northwest, United, and USAir raised the domestic FFP award-ticket exchange
rate from 20,000 to 25,000 miles. Id. Delta lowered the amount of miles needed by 17%
from 30,000 to 25,000, but it correspondingly decreased the minimum mileage award from
1000 to 500 miles. Id. See also Frequent Flyers?, TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 15.
I1. Beat the Clock supra note 8, at 104. American, Continental, Northwest, and
United increased the number of miles needed for international and Hawaii tickets between
17% and 50%. Id.
12. See, e.g., Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 88-C8158, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12026, at *7 n.2 (N.D. III. Oct. 24, 1988), aff'd, 565 N.E.2d 258 (Il1. App. Ct.
1990), aft'd, 589 N.E.2d 533 (111 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 1396 (1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995), ajffd in part and
rev'd in part, 646 N.E.2d 1218 (Il. 1995) [hereinafter Wolens 1]. See also infra notes 76-
128 and accompanying text (discussing pre-emption).
13. Consideration of these cases has been postponed pending resolution of the pre-
emption issue. See infra text accompanying notes 76-128 (exploring the pre-emption
issue).
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Supreme Court ruled that the 1988 suits may proceed on the facts despite
airline deregulation statutes. 4
Courts across the country have reached inconsistent results in suits
arising from FFPs. The confusion is due, in part, to the problem of
placing a value on frequent-flyer miles. For example, the airlines use
draconian measures to enforce the FFP rules, 5 citing the great costs
they incur in providing award tickets. 6 Simultaneously, however, the
airlines plead to their accountants17 and to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)' 8 that the tickets represent empty seats and thus have little value,
if any. Consumers similarly place great value on award tickets when
seeking to protect them, 9 yet later downplay their worth to the IRS.20
14. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) [hereinafter Wolens
VII]. See infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text (discussing the disposition of the
Wolens case in greater detail).
15. For example, the airlines have deleted all accumulated mileage and barred firther
participation to members caught violating the program rules. See Charles Boisseau, Buying
Tickets From Frequent-Flier Brokers Could Land You in Trouble, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 11,
1995, at Cl (quoting Continental Airlines spokesperson saying, "We actively seek and
pursue any infractions of our [FFP] rules and file suits and close accounts when fraud is
discovered.'). In addition, airlines have encouraged the criminal prosecution of persons
found "stealing" miles. See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.) (wire
fraud theft), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); United
States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming defendant's conviction of wire
fraud for stealing FFP credits); United States v. Schreier, 908 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1990)
(wire fraud theft), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
16. See Boisseau, supra note 15, at C1 (quoting an American Airlines spokesperson
as saying selling frequent flyer awards cost his company "millions").
17. Terry Lloyd, Financial Language In Legal Documents, in ACCOUNTING FOR
LAWYERS 1993, at 359, 407-08 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-830, 1993) (noting that most airlines do not list outstanding miles and corresponding
awards as liabilities on their balance sheets, in part because the real cost of awards is
minimal). See Major Airlines Said to be Developing Uniform Worldwide Accounting
Guidelines, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 29, 1992, at 209, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (noting that 25 of the world's largest airlines agreed
to develop accounting guidelines for reporting frequent-flyer mileage as a liability).
18. See Charley v. Commissioner, 66 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1429 (1993) (holding
that FFP awards earned on business travel are taxable income under I.1.C. § 61); Thomas
J. St. Ville, Final Regs. on Fringe Benefits Fail to Resolve Many Substantive Issues, 72
J. TAX'N 210, 213 (1990) (noting the difficulty of valuing FFP awards for tax purposes).
19. Frequent flyer credits are often a hotly contested item in divorce settlements,
indicating the value consumers place on "their" miles. See, e.g., Lockett v. Lockett, No.
FA93-0130043S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1751, at *14 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1994)
(allowing defendant to keep all of his FFP miles); Ward v. Ward, No. 30 39 27, 1994 WL
118947, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1994) (dividing all the FFP miles equally);
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This Note analyzes the rights consumers have in relation to the
airlines' frequent flyer programs and how they can assert those rights.
Part II traces the development of FFPs within the deregulated airline
industry. Part III examines which state-based claims remain after
deregulation. Part IV suggests a federal claim that consumers may assert
against FFPs. Part V evaluates the impact of both deregulation and the
subsequent FFP cases on the claims consumers can bring. Finally, Part
VI recommends a judicial approach which would protect consumers'
rights without re-regulating the airline industry.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FFPs IN THE DEREGULATED
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
On October 24, 1978, after a decades-long debate, Congress
withdrew the American airline industry from the protection of the U.S.
government and it became an unregulated industry.2 ' Since 1938, the
federal government had heavily regulated air carriers in an effort to
protect the general consumer from an overly competitive industry.22
During this era of regulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
Horowitz v. Horowitz, No. FA90-0274070S, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 467, *13 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 1992) (allowing both parties to keep their own FFP credits); George
v. George, CPI No. 1320-90, 1992 Del. Fano. Ct., LEXIS 52, at *33 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov.
24, 1992) (dividing miles according to husband's suggestion); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812
P.2d 1320, 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (dividing FFP "points" equally and refusing to
place value on such). See also In re Ellis, 149 B.R. 927, 932 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993)
(holding in bankruptcy proceeding that, because there was a property settlement to debtor's
wife for half of the husband's mileage, the frequent flyer mileage was not dischargeable).
Airlines are well aware of the value passengers place on these frequent-flyer miles. See
More Mileage For Your Money, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at D4 (quoting Delta FFP
manager stating "[c]onsumers place a very high value on free miles").
20. See supra note 18.
21. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.) See also Levine, supra note 4, at 393-
408 (discussing the years of debate leading up to deregulation).
22. See Amy Hunt, Assault on the Airline Industry: Private Antitrust Litigation and
the Problem of Settlement, 59 J. AIR L. & CoM. 983, 987 (1994) (stating regulation was
a result of "destructive competition"). See also Levine, supra note 4, at 393. Regulation
first began in 1925 with the passage of the Kelly Airmail Act to control the airmail
system. Pub. L. No. 68-359, 43 Stat. 805 (1925). However, comprehensive and
systematic regulation of the airline industry did not begin until 1938. Levine, supra note
4, at 397-98. See generally Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregula-
tion and the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 179 (reviewing
the "public interest" theory of regulation).
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controlled interstate air-fares and protected the consumer from the
airlines' deceptive practices.' The CAB oversaw most aspects of the
airline industry through a tariff system 24 which required airlines to
file' "all classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and services in
connection with [their] air transportation. 26 Additionally, the CAB had
primary jurisdiction over cases relating to tariff violations, including
unjust practices by the airlines.27
In 1978, Congress determined that competitive market forces would
better shape the airline industry.28 It asserted that competition among
airlines would produce a consumers' market characterized by "efficiency,
innovation, ... low prices, [and] variety [and] quality ... of air
transportation services. '29  The Airline Deregulation Act of 197830
(ADA) eliminated, inter alia, the interstate tariff system, the CAB's
review of just and reasonable practices, and the CAB's primary
jurisdiction over cases involving airlines and consumers.31
Deregulation sparked a short-term surge in airline profitability and
lower consumer prices.32 However, after the initial tide ebbed, fierce
competition drove airlines to be more creative in their sales and
23. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, cA. 601, § 201, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Civil
Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, § 3, 98 Stat. 1703.
24. The third definition of "tariff' in Black's Law Dictionary states, "A public
document setting forth services of common carrier being offered, rates and charges with
respect to services and governing rules, regulations and practices relating to those
services." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1456-57 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
25. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373 (1982) (repealed
1994). See also infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text (discussing the filing
requirement for tariffs).
26. 14 C.F.R. § 221.3(a) (1995).
27. FAA, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1482, repealed by 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (1988). See also
Braden, supra note 1, at 729 n.12 (discussing the CAB's primary jurisdiction).
28. See Hunt, supra note 22, at 988-89 (noting that despite concerns over mergers
Congress believed that the industry could sustain workable competition).
29. ADA, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(4), (a)(9) (1988).
30. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C. app.).
31. Braden, supra note 1, at 729 n.12 (citing Calvin Davidson & David H. Solomon,
Air Carrier Liability Under Deregulation, 49 J. AIR. L. & COM. 31, 32-33 (1983)). In
1985, Congress eliminated the CAB and transferred its remaining duties to the Department
of Transportation (DOT). Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act, § 3, amended by 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1551 (1988).
32. See Levine, supra note 4, at 480.
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marketing techniques.3 3 One outgrowth of this rivalry was the develop-
ment of FFPs,34 which promote airline "brand loyalty" by providing
passengers with credits or miles that passengers could accumulate and
redeem for gifts after attaining certain levels. 35 American Airlines first
introduced the concept to the industry on May 1, 1981 as a short-term
promotion. 3' However, due to consumers' overwhelming acceptance,
the programs developed into an extremely powerful marketing tool and
spread to all major airlines.37
The airlines run their respective programs according to a set of
"program rules. 35 While these rules differ by airline, they are similar
in many major respects.39 Common among all programs are rules
which prohibit any sale or barter of awards, limit mileage earning only
to the member, and reserve for the airlines the unilateral right to change
33. See Klingaman, supra note 3, at 336. Predictions of fluctuations in industry size,
routes, prices, and concentration proved true. Id. at 282.
34. See Levine, supra note 4, at 414. The competition produced many other
unanticipated effects, including mergers, vertical integration, hub domination, complex fare
structures, changed roles for travel agents, and computer reservation systems (CRS). Id.
at 408. See also Klingaman, supra note 3, at 325-410 (discussing similar non-price
developments of deregulation).
35. See Klingaman, supra note 3, at 336. See also Braden, supra note 1, at 731.
36. See Klingaman, supra note 3, at 336; Levine, supra note 4, at 414. See also
American-PR 5/1/81, supra note 4 (citing the correct date for the beginning of the
program). American began the program as a one-year promotion. See id. United Airlines
challenged American and began with a 19-month program. See United-PR 5/6/81, supra
note 5.
37. Klingaman, supra note 3, at 336; Levine, supra note 4, at 414. Professor Levine
states that the programs were so popular with consumers that they spread to airlines that,
because they already enjoyed price and route monopolies, theoretically would not benefit
from this added marketing power. Id. Another result of the original FFPs' success was
that the airlines quietly removed the one-year time limit. See N.R. Kleinfield, The
Frequent Flyer Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1982, at DI, D2 (noting airlines were
reluctant to identify a termination date for their programs, and stating that airlines claimed
the programs would continue "as long as they produce results").
38. See various FFPs' program rules (on file with author).
39. The FFPs generally send the "program rules" to new members with their
membership packets. Significant rules also appear on mileage statements and award
coupons. The airlines may publish updated versions of the rules and program changes.
See Association of Discount Travel Brokers v. Continental/Eastern Tariff, DOT Order 92-
5-60, May 29, 1992, at *9 n.5, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 133179 [hereinafter
DOT Order 5/29/92]. The program rules are also contained in the various Computer
Reservation Systems (CRS) used by the airlines.
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and cancel the program at anytime.40  The airlines have also tended to
act in concert regarding significant rule changes: the airlines have
enacted major revisions in 1982,41 1988,42 and 1995. 41
Originally, the programs only credited miles for trips with the
sponsoring airline.' However, the programs quickly expanded earning
opportunities by providing credits to members using FFP "partners. 45
These FFP partners typically included other travel-related companies such
as additional airlines, car rental agencies, cruise lines, and hotels.46 In
time, the airlines also formed partnerships in the non-travel arena with
businesses such as credit card companies and long distance telephone
carrers.47
The expanded partner programs allowed members to earn more
mileage credits.48 As a result, a greater percentage of airline passengers
40. See examples of various program rules (on file with author).
41. See Gay N. Myers, Airlines Bolster Bonus Programs, Aim at Building Brand
Loyalty, TRAVEL WKLY., Apr. 30, 1983, at 30 (alluding that rule changes to the 1982
programs were frequent, but not well publicized).
42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the number of class action
suits filed after FFP changes in 1988).
43. See Beat the Clock, supra note 8, at 104; Lockwood, supra note 6, at T3
(discussing 1995 FFP changes).
44. See American-PR 5/1/81, supra note 4; United-PR 5/6/81, supra note 5, TWA-PR
5/11/81, supra note 5; Delta-PR 8/4/81, supra note 5.
45. Delta initiated the first expansion into FFP airline partners. See To Travel Editor,
PR NEWSERVICE, Oct. 23, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
(announcing 11 new commuter air-carriers offering Delta FFP credit).
46. Hotel, car rental, and cruise line partners did not develop until 1983. See Gay N.
Myers, More Bonuses for Frequent Flyers, TRAVEL WKLY., May 30, 1984, at 58 (covering
program developments in 1983-1984).
47. The first affinity credit cards, which gave one part of mileage credit for each dollar
spent, began in 1986. See Dennis P. O'Connell, Trends: Using Affinity Marketing to Lure
New Credit Card Customers, AM. BANKER, Sept. 15, 1986, at 18. Telephone company
partnerships, which award one mile for each dollar spent on long distance service, began
September 1, 1988, between Northwest Airlines and MCI. See Northwest Airlines, MCI
Communications Corporation, PR NEwswiRE, June 14, 1988, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File. These partnerships operate as follows: The partners offer FFP
miles to their customers to generate customer loyalty; after a customer uses a partner, the
partner issues the mileage and pays the airline for such. See Thornton Clark, Big Airlines
Hold Winning Ticket in Frequent Flyer Sweepstakes, TRAVEL WKLY., Aug. 9, 1984, at 1,
4. The partners may also offer FFP awards which utilize their services, such as miles for
free cruises. Id. The airlines may or may not pay the partner for these awards.
48. Airline officials argue that the new partners and earning options create more
opportunities to earn mileage, thus overcoming any disappointment members might have
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flew on "free" tickets, theoretically displacing passengers willing to pay
for seats.4 9 Furthermore, through the new partnerships, members earned
miles without flying, thereby diluting the direct marketing impact of the
programs.5" This objectively predictable, but unforeseen, result spurred
the first major revision of the program rules in 1988. 5' Airlines
instituted "black-out" date restrictions,52 capacity limits on seat avail-
ability,5a and, for some airlines, time-dated miles that expired after two
or three years.54
regarding devaluation of their current mileage credit by retrospective program changes.
See More Mileage For Your Money, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at D4 (noting new earning
opportunities "by shopping, eating out or talking on the telephone").
The increase in award tickets may also be due to the natural aging of the programs. For
example, less frequent flyers do not earn many miles per year and can only redeem awards
after significant time has passed. Other travelers will not redeem their miles frequently,
choosing to build miles over a long period in order to redeem them for higher level
awards.
49. See Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676, 691
n. 12 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Transworld 17]; but see Lockwood, supra note 6, at T3
(noting that "[t]hrough their computerized capacity control systems, the airlines rarely give
away a seat that would otherwise have been occupied by a paying passenger").
50. Some observers estimate that 40% of all frequent-flyer credit earned in 1994 came
from non-airline partners. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at T3.
51. See Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 533, 534 (I11. App. 1992),
vacated, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) [hereinafter Wolens III].
52. "Black-out" dates are dates on which the award tickets may not be used due to
anticipated high passenger traffic. See Leonard Sloane, Free-Flight Programs Shift
Course, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1988, at 48 (reviewing the major FFP changes in 1988).
53. Airlines are able to limit the availability of certain types of tickets through their
computer reservation systems (CRS). This allows airlines to maximize price elasticity.
For example, airlines can keep seats open for those travelers who book reservations at the
last minute and are willing to pay higher prices. The airlines place FFP-award tickets at
the lowest priority because these tickets generate no revenue. Therefore, those traveling
on FFP award-tickets often find that they cannot make reservations for the day they want
to travel, despite the fact that the flights may not be fully booked. Most programs offer
"unlimited" award tickets which are not restricted by black-out dates or capacity limita-
tions; however, these tickets normally require 50% more miles to be redeemed. Id.
54. Mounting levels of unclaimed miles increased the airlines' liability. Airlines
instituted the "use it or lose it" rule, in order to maintain a constant level of liability. Most
airlines added this rule to their FFPs in the 1995 changes. See Beat the Clock, supra note
8, at 104.
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The increase in ways to accumulate program miles also unexpected-
ly spawned a "gray market" for frequent-flyer award tickets. 5 Frequent
travelers found themselves with more "free"" tickets than they could
use.57 Enterprising travel agencies began acting as "brokers," buying
frequent flyer award tickets from mileage-rich members and selling them
to other travelers at discounted rates.5 In response, the airlines began
to police this market.59 The airlines ultimately took two actions: they
completely disqualified members who sold their award tickets60 and
they filed lawsuits against the brokers for tortious interference with
business relations and unfair competition.6'
Subsequently, the airlines made a number of changes in the way
they administered the FFPs. Some airlines transferred responsibility for
the programs from marketing departments to separate divisions estab-
lished solely for the administration of FFPs.62 Other airlines contracted
out the programs and created an independent "frequency marketing"
service industry.63 The culmination of this independent organizational
55. See Paul Grimes, Practical Traveler: Air Fares for Bargain Hunters, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1982, § 10, at 3. See generally Braden, supra note 1 (presenting history of FFP-
ticket brokering and the legal ramifications of such activity).
56. Many consumers view these award tickets as "free." However, as the Chief
Executive Officer of Kiwi International-the only airline not offering a frequent-flyer
program-recently said: "Frequent travelers are fooling themselves into thinking they are
getting something for nothing when they unnecessarily spend thousands of dollars to get
one free trip." One low-priced airline suggested that corporations should force carriers to
drop their FFPs and correspondingly lower their prices. Joel Sleed, Business Muscles in
on Frequent Flyer Bonuses, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 1995, at 7T.
57. See Kleinfield, supra note 37, at D2.
58. Id.
59. See Boisseau, supra note 15, at Cl. The IRS has also begun to police the selling
of award tickets. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Central Florida IRS office
audited and gave tax bills to employees who tried to profit by selling the FFP credits they
received while traveling on company business. Ironically, the IRS set the value of the
tickets by using the gray-market rate of 1.5 cents per mile. James S. Hirsch, IRS Office
in Florida Begins a Crackdown on Frequent Fliers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1993, at A10.
60. Boisseau, supra note 15, at Cl.
61. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992);
TransworldII, 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Ticket Exch., Inc.,
793 F. Supp. 976 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
62. See, e.g., various program rules listing separate independent departments as
responsible for the FFPs (on file with author).
63. See Len Egol, Rewarding Loyalty: Identifying, Then Holding on to Loyal
Customers is Database Marketing's Challenge for the '90s, DIRECT, June 1991, at 23
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movement was Air Miles International, which operated a frequent flyer
program without an affiliated airline."
Today, FFPs have further expanded the opportunities for their
customers to earn miles.65 Consequently, the programs have come to
resemble the ubiquitous "green stamp."'  This has resulted in a further
dilution of the programs' marketing strength and an increase in the
number of award travelers. In response to this development, the airlines
again revised and strengthened the program rules effective February 1,
1995.67 It is unclear what all the changes were, but some were obvious.
For example, the number of miles needed for a domestic ticket award
was increased by twenty-five percent."
Most FFP members do not complain about the prospective changes
to the programs; rather they protest the retroactive application of the new
rules to miles earned under the old programs.69 This retroactive
application in effect "devalues" the credits that members have already
accumulated in their mileage "bank accounts."7 The members contend
that these devaluations are unfair because they were unilaterally imposed
(discussing consulting and services for frequency programs such as FFPs and hotel
frequent-stay programs); Frequency Marketing: How to Motivate ConsumerLoyalty, SALES
& MKTi. MGMT., Sept. 1990, at 132 (discussing the frequency marketing industry).
64. Air Miles sought to replicate in the United States its successful programs in
Canada and Great Britain, where miles are awarded for everything from groceries to eye
glasses. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Consumers Get Free Air Miles For Everyday Products,
UPI, Apr. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. This evolution shows
the degree to which FFPs have strayed from their original purpose of creating airline brand
loyalty.
65. For example, some pharmaceutical companies offer mileage to doctors who
prescribe their drugs. Susan H. Fisher, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceuti-
cal "Freebies, " 1991 DuKE L.J. 206, 211 (1991).
66. See Sleed, supra note 56, at 7T.
67. See Beat the Clock supra note 8, at 104. Some changes did not take place until
April 1, 1995, such as the increase in the redemption rate for award travel to Hawaii. The
airlines also delayed the increase in the redemption rate for international travel until April
1, 1995. Id.
68. Ed Perkins, Tough Year For Frequent Fliers Coming Up, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan.
15, 1995, at TR3. Perkins notes that the "published cutbacks are bad enough-more miles
[needed] for most free trips." Id. However, he sees the "hidden" cutbacks, such as
reduced seat availability for award tickets, as the most damaging change for members. Id.
69. See, e.g., Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc. 565 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Il1. App. Ct.
1990) [hereinafter Wolens 11].
70. See Beat the Clock, supra note 8, at 104.
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after the relationship or "deal" was established.7 The frustration
aroused by the 1988 devaluation spurred a number of lawsuits' and the
recent rule changes have the potential to do the same.
III. CONSUMER CLAIMS UNDER STATE LAW
Throughout the era of regulation, federal tariffs governed the
relationship between consumers and air carriers.73 Thus, most problems
concerning an airline fell under federal jurisdiction, while state law had
only limited application to airlines.74 When deregulation partially
eliminated the tariff system,75 some ambiguity developed regarding
consumers' access to relief under state law.
A. The ADA's Pre-emption Clause
Congress anticipated the resulting confusion over the applicability
of state and federal law. In drafting the ADA, Congress included
provisions which prevented the states from re-regulating the industry.76
The ADA's pre-emption clause, § 1305(a),77 prohibits states from
71. Wolens 11, 565 N.E.2d at 260. Some airlines avoided the litigation problem
following the 1988 revisions by continuing to honor previously earned credits according
to the old program rules. See Greenberg v. United Airlines, 563 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 1991). By adopting this logical and fair
approach in conjunction with the current FFP modifications, the airlines could have
avoided cumbersome litigation and limited the number of members' complaints. However,
there is no evidence that any of the airlines are opting to pursue this approach with the
1995 changes.
72. See, e.g., supra note 12 (citing case resulting from the 1988 revisions).
73. United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1979). See supra note 24
(defining "tariffs").
74. Before deregulation, state law determined intrastate fares and violations of
deceptive practices laws. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290,298-300 (1976).
The dichotomy evident between courts that rule on FFP problems as contractual issues, see
infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text, and those that rule on these problems as tariff
issues, see infra notes 135-74 and accompanying text, demonstrates the inconsistent
approaches taken by courts.
75. Congress implemented deregulation gradually during a five-year period,
culminating in 1985 with the transfer of responsibility for the airline industry from the
CAB to the DOT. See Klingaman, supra note 3, at 286.
76. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979
(1992).
77. ADA, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988).
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directly or indirectly regulating the airline industry."8  The clause
expressly prohibits states from enacting or enforcing "any law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law
relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.""
The airlines assert that the ADA's pre-emption clause invalidates all
consumer state-based causes of action.8" Consumer advocates, includ-
ing several state attorneys general, concede that Congress pre-empted
direct regulation; however, they argue that airlines are still subject to
state consumer-protection, tort, and contract laws.8'
B. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens: The First Round
On January 18, 1995, the Supreme Court in American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens, 2 began to clarify which state laws the ADA pre-empts and
which laws consumers may still utilize. 3  In Wolens, consumers
brought a class action suit against American Airlines for changing its
frequent flyer program-AAdvantage." The consumers brought the
action under both the Illinois state consumer-protection statute85 and
common law contract theories.86 The plaintiffs originally sought an
78. See infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text (discussing pre-emption of state
airline regulations).
79. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988). Congress re-enacted Title 49 of the U.S.
Code in 1994 without intending to make substantive changes. Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§ (a), 108 Stat. 745 (1994). The new provision reads: "[A] State... may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to
a price, route, or service of an air carrier .. " 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (1995).
Of course, the pre-emption clause had no effect on federal statutes that still applied to
airlines. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373(b)(1) (requiring airlines to observe their filed
tariffs).
80. Wolens 11, 565 N.E.2d at 261.
81. See Eric W. Maclure, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption
Provision Clips States' Wings on Regulation ofAir Fare Advertising, 71 N.C. L. RnV. 905,
907 (1993) (citing Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2041).
82. 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
83. Id. at 822-23.
84. Id. at 822. In 1988, American Airlines introduced a number of changes to the
AAdvantage program. While American did not raise the award redemption levels, it added
new restrictions on the award tickets, such as black-out dates and limits on seat
availability. Id. See Michael Briggs, Frequent Flier Suit OK'd, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 18,
1995, at 1.
85. Wolens VII, 115 S. Ct. at 822.
86. Id.
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injunction to prohibit the frequent flyer changes, as well as monetary and
punitive damages."
During the era of regulation the CAB would have had primary
jurisdiction over this case.88 However, deregulation had removed
primary jurisdiction to the judicial system.89 Thus, it was unclear
whether any federal issues remained.' The U.S. district court held that
it lacked jurisdiction, asserting that the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint
did not raise any federal issues.9 The Illinois trial court accepted
jurisdiction, but the pre-emption issue forestalled a hearing on the facts
of the case.92
The Appellate Court of Illinois heard the pre-emption issue in an
interlocutory appeal.93 The court ruled that to provide the plaintiffs
with any form of injunctive relief against the AAdvantage program
would violate the ADA's pre-emption clause.94 The court reasoned that
an injunction would force the airline to act in a certain manner and thus
would be tantamount to state regulation.95 The court, however, allowed
the contract and consumer fraud actions to proceed, holding that the FFP
was not an "air service."96 It found that the FFP program had "only a
tangential relation to defendant's rates and services" and therefore was
87. Id. at 822 n.3; Wolens 11, 565 N.E.2d at 260.
88. See Braden, supra note 1, at 729-30.
89. First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1122 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that the validity of limited-liability terms in shipping contract became a
purely judicial issue after deregulation).
90. Wolens I, No. 88-C8158, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12026 at *3 (N.D. Il1. Oct. 24,
1988). There is no indication why the plaintiffs did not bring a federal tariff-based action.
See infra notes 135-74 and accompanying text (discussing the tariff system and subsequent
cases). One may speculate that the decision was a strategic move to avoid the federal
court. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81 (discussing forum-shopping issues arising
in FFP litigation).
91. Wolens 1, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12026 at *2. The airlines had removed the
action to the federal district court on the ground that the complaint raised a federal
question. Wolens I, 565 N.E.2d at 260.
92. Wolens HI, 565 N.E.2d at 260. Once the case was remanded to state court, the
airlines moved for dismissal arguing that 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) pre-empted the plaintiffs'
state-law claims. After denying its motion to dismiss, the court permitted the airline to file
an interlocutory appeal. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 261.
95. Id.
96. Wolens 1, 565 N.E.2D at 262. See also infra note 97 (discussing "air services").
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not expressly pre-empted by § 1305." American appealed to the
Supreme Court of Illinois,98 which affirmed and allowed the consumer-
fraud and contract claims to survive.'
American then sought a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court."re While the case was sub judice, the Court decided
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1 which also concerned the pre-
97. Wolens HI, 565 N.E.2d at 262. The court found that FFPs did not sufficiently
impact what an airline did-flying-to be considered an "air service." 1d. The Supreme
Court subsequently overruled this finding. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
There is an alternative argument that an FFP is not an air service because an FFP is not
an "air carrier" under 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1988). Proponents of this approach argue that
FFPs have lost their uniquely airline nature through partnership expansion, and have
become generic frequency-marketing services, much like Air Miles International.
Accordingly, if an FFP were not an "air carrier," Title 49 would not apply and all state
remedies would be available. Ironically, American Airlines made this argument to the
DOT when it pleaded that FFP-prograrn rules should not become part of the required
federal tariff. The DOT stated:
[F]requent flyer programs are broad-based marketing programs which extend far
beyond air transportation. Members can earn mileage awards by renting cars
or making credit card or catalogue purchases as well as by flying; the awards
may be used to obtain discounts for hotels, cars, and merchandise as well as for
air fares.... In these circumstances, [tariffs should not apply].
See American Ass'n of Discount Travel Brokers, DOT Order 89-9-25, Sept. 13, 1989,
available in WESTLAW, 1989 WL 256037, at *2-*3 [hereinafter DOT Order 9/13/89].
This rationale seems even more compelling, whether used as a sword or a shield, as credit-
earning opportunities have expanded. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text
(discussing partnership and mileage-earning opportunities).
98. Wolens 111, 589 N.E.2d 533 (I11. 1992).
99. Id. at 536. The court also addressed the airline's contention that the state-law
claims were implicitly pre-empted by the FAA § 102(a)(7), "which states that the
prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive practices in air transportation
shall be considered in the public interest and in accordance with the public convenience."
Id. at 535. The court noted that there was no evidence that Congress intended to give
federal law exclusive authority. Id. Thus, the remaining actions were not implicitly pre-
empted by FAA. Id. The court found it unnecessary to rule on American's argument that
the Commerce Clause barred injunctive relief, because it held that § 1305(a) pre-empted
injunctive relief. Wolens 1I1, 589 N.E.2d at 536.
100. Wolens v. American Airline, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 205, 206 (Ill. 1993), cert. granted,
114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) [hereinafter
Wolens V].
101. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
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emption clause. As a result, the Court remanded Wolens back to the
Illinois Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Morales. 2
C. Morales and Consumer Protection Laws
Morales dealt with the issue of whether states could use consumer-
protection laws to prohibit allegedly deceptive advertising by the
airlines.' '3 The Supreme Court ruled that § 1305's "relating to rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier" language was to be interpreted
broadly." The Court analogized the ADA to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) in which the relevant
provision declares that all state laws are pre-empted "insofar as they...
relate to any employee benefit plan."' ' Interpreting the ERISA pre-
emption clause, the Supreme Court had held that any state law "relates
to" an employee benefit plan where "it has a connection with or
reference to such."' 6
The Morales Court applied this broad reading of the pre-emptory
language and found that, because the states' advertising guidelines have
a "significant impact" on air fares, § 1305 pre-empted the states'
actions.' 7 The Court also noted and agreed with the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), who
objected to the proposed use of the state consumer-protection laws
because of their regulatory nature.1°8  Thus, the Court ruled the
consumer protection laws pre-empted." The Court noted, however,
that not all state laws would be pre-empted because some would have
"too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" an impact on airline fares."0
102. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992), cert. granted, 114 S.
Ct. 1396 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) [hereinafter Wolens
1iv.
103. Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
104. Id. at 383-84.
105. Id. at 383. See also ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
106. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983), rev'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir.
1981).
107. Morales, 504 U.S. at 391.
108. Id. at 374.
109. Id. at 391.
110. Id. at 390 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
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D. Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc.: The Second Round
On their second hearing of Wolens, the Illinois Supreme Court
maintained its earlier position and denied pre-emption of the consumer-
fraud and contract claims under § 1305 despite the Morales decision."'
The court seized upon the Supreme Court's language and ruled that FFPs
were not an essential element of an airline." 2 Thus, the court held that
the state law claims against FFPs related too tenuously or remotely to an
airlines' rates, routes, or service to be pre-empted.1
3
American again sought a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court."4 The Court granted the writ and heard the case in
the October 1994 term." 5 The Court also received an amicus curiae
brief for the United States, by the DOT." 6  The Court, in a split
decision on its second reading of the scope of § 1305, closely followed
the reasoning of the United States' amicus brief and held that the ADA
did, in fact, pre-empt state consumer-protection laws." 7 The majority
reasoned that the consumer-protection laws were an intrusive form of
regulation of an airline's business and were thus pre-empted."'
However, the Court also held that the ADA did not pre-empt common
law contract actions because Congress did not intend to block traditional
remedies available at state law." 9
111. Wolens V, 626 N.E.2d 205, 208-09 (II. 1993).
112. Id. at 208. Specifically, the court stated: "Indeed, the airline industry functioned
successfully for decades prior to providing incentives to its travelers in the form of
frequent flyer programs." Id.
113. Id. at 208-09.
114. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 115 S. CL 817 (1995) [hereinafter Wolens VI].
115. See Aeronautics: Federal Pre-emption; State Law Challenges to Airline Frequent
Flyer Programs, 63 U.S.L.W. 3361 (Nov. 8, 1994).
116. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. CL 817 (1995) (No. 93-1286), available in LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Briefs File. The Court also received amicus curiae briefs supporting American's
position from United Airlines, Air Transport Association of America, and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States. Id.
117. Wolens VII, 115 S. CL at 823-25.
118. Id. at 823.
119. Id. at 824.
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The Court did not rule on the issue as defined by the Illinois
Supreme Court, stating simply that the plaintiffs' claims did relate to
rates as defined by Morales, regardless of whether an FFP was "essen-
tial" or not. 2 ' Instead, the majority focused on the "enact or enforce
any law" language of § 1305.121 The Court stated that the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act" is prescriptive, serving as a means to guide and
police marketing practices." Furthermore, by controlling marketing
practices, the consumer statute does not simply give effect to agreements
made by the airlines, but tries to control what the airlines may do in the
promotion of their business. 24 Thus, by enforcing the consumer law,
the state was treading upon regulatory ground that Congress specifically
removed from state control."z
Though it barred the state consumer-protection claim, the Court
allowed the contract claim to proceed. 26  The Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend the ADA's pre-emption clause to be used as a
shield against self-created contractual agreements.127  The Supreme
Court held, however, that the ADA's pre-emption clause will not allow
courts to apply public policy considerations. 2 1 Instead, the courts must
strictly confine their interpretations of the FFP rules to their language;
the language represents the parties' bargain.'2 9 The dissenting justices
argued that this restriction effectively prevents courts from using most of
120. Id. at 823. The Court held that FFPs affected "rates" because the changes in
FFPs essentially altered what American charged in miles for free tickets and upgrades.
Id.
121. Wolens JV/, 115 S. Ct. at 823. See also 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) ("[N]o state
... shall enact or enforce any law ... relating to ... rates, routes, or services.")
(emphasis added).
122. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/2 (1992).
123. Wolens VII, 115 S. Ct. at 823.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 823-24. The Court noted that the DOT retains the authority to order an
airline to cease and desist from unfair and deceptive practices. Id. at 824 n.4. See also
49 U.S.C. app. § 1381(a) (DOT's deceptive practice statute).
126. Wolens VII, 115 S. Ct. at 824.
127. Id. at 824. The court also noted that ruling in this manner gave effect to the FAA
savings clause, which preserves "the remedies now existing at common law or by statute."
Id. at 826.
128. Id. The Court read the ADA pre-emption clause and the FAA savings clause
together to limit state regulation of airlines. Id.
129. Wolens VII, 115 S. Ct. at 826.
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the modem tools for interpreting "unconscionable" or "adhesive"
contracts. 3 °
The case will now return to the Illinois trial court on the surviving
contract claim. In the aftermath of their seven-year struggle on the pre-
emption issue, the plaintiffs in Wolens and other FFP suits are still only
beginning their legal battle against the airlines over unbargained-for
changes in their FFPs."' It remains unclear how the courts will view
these purely contractual issues. Claims against an airline's FFP still
present many unresolved issues, including: (1) when the parties formed
the FFP agreement; (2) what the terms of the contract are; and (3) what
the damages are in the case of breach. This Note does not investigate
the likelihood of consumer success under the state-law theory, but
suggests that American Airlines will litigate the matter fully and will
raise a number of sound defenses. 32  Therefore, it appears that a
successful outcome for FFP members will be time consuming 3 and
remains doubtful. 13
4
130. Id. at 833-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority approach has the potential
to defeat most frequent flyer claims because, without public-policy-based arguments, state
courts cannot hold contracts or clauses "unreasonable" or "unconscion-able." Thus,
because courts are only permitted to strictly interpret contract language, consumers will
not have access to the consumer-protection laws that have developed over the past 50
years (e.g., the theory of adhesion contracts). Id.
131. American Airlines has stated, "We... will vigorously defend on the [contractual]
merits in state court." Briggs, supra note 84, at 1.
132. See infra note 134 (discussing plaintiffs' possible arguments and the defense's
likely response). In Wolens VII the Court noted an argument which could prevail under
the state contract-law claim. Wolens VII, 115 S. Ct. 817 at 826-27. This argument
asserted that retroactive changes to FFPs should not be allowed despite an airline's
reservation of the right to change the program because the reservation only applies to
prospective changes. Id. While this interpretation seems plausible, it is a matter for the
lower court to decide after a full hearing of the case.
133. Both parties have already fought for seven years on the pre-emption issue and
there is no indication that the remaining contractual issues will be solved quickly or easily.
See Briggs, supra note 84, at 1.
134. There are several precedent-backed arguments that American can be expected to
make in litigating the contract-law claim. For example, American may argue that the
contract at issue was not formed until the FFP issued an award certificate. This position
is supported by Transworld Airlines 17, 913 F.2d at 688 (implying that the courts assumed
that the frequent-flyer contract was formed when the consumer received the award ticket).
See infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text (discussing Transworld 11). But see DOT
Order 5/29/92, supra note 39, at *5-*6 (stating DOT view that the contract between the
FFP and the consumer is formed when the consumer accepts by flying on the carrier).
The airline may also argue that miles have no value. See Transworld1I, 913 F.2d at 691-
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In sum, the result of the series of Wolens cases to date is as follows:
(1) The ADA pre-emption clause, § 1305, prevents courts from applying
state consumer-protection laws to resolve a dispute between an airline
and an FFP member, and (2) courts may adjudicate such a claim using
state contract law. However, (3) courts may not resort to recent
innovations in contractual interpretation and construction, such as public-
policy-based consumer-protection laws.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL CLAIM
Consumers may have a second means to challenge unreasonable
changes in airlines' FFPs. Prior to deregulation, claims against airlines
were resolved primarily by the CAB. 35 However, after exhausting
administrative channels, parties turned to the federal courts and federal
common law. 36 Before deregulation, issues involving airlines were
linked inseparably with the mandated tariffs which governed every aspect
of an airline's relationship with the flying public. 37
The tariff system, administered initially by the CAB, and subse-
quently by the DOT, was Congress' primary means to control the airline
industry. 38 Under the tariff system, airlines were required to have
their consumer agreements, "tariffs," pre-approved by the agency.'39
After administrative review and approval, the tariffs became the sole
basis of the airline-passenger relationship. 4 The approved tariffs had
the force of law; airlines were not allowed to make agreements with
93 (holding that award tickets have no value, because they only represent unsold seats).
But see American Airlines, Inc. v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 416-17 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that despite an inability to assess the direct damage of a misused award ticket,
some value does exist); United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that frequent flyer credits are items of value).
135. See also Maclure, supra note 81, at 906.
136. See, e.g., Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.
1977).
137. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373 (1982) (requiring airlines, under FAA § 403, to file with
the CAB all rules and regulations in connection with their air service).
138. See Braden, supra note 1, at 729-30.
139. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373 (1988).
140. United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing Tishman &
Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401, 1403 (2d Cir. 1969) for the holding that
tariffs are the exclusive basis of the airline-passenger relationship).
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passengers inconsistent with the tariffs.'14  Passengers could challenge
the administrative determination that the tariffs were valid in federal
court. 42  If a court found that a tariff was "unreasonable or unjustly
discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial,' 43 the tariff was
declared void and unenforceable.'"4
In the post-regulation era, Congress continues to require the airlines
to file tariffs for many aspects of their relationship with consumers.'
45
As a result of the ADA, jurisdiction to review the tariffs has fallen to the
federal courts. 46 A disgruntled FFP member may have an alternative
basis for a suit against an airline by bringing a federal claim based on the
reasonableness of the airline's filed tariff.
In Transworld Airlines, Inc., v. American Coupon Exchange,
Inc., 47 the Ninth Circuit addressed an FFP question based on the
airline's tariff and, thus, applied federal law.148  Transworld involved
a suit brought by the airline against American Coupon Exchange, a
141. Id. at 462 n.2.
142. Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting
that the determination of a tariffs validity is a judicial question requiring the application
of federal common law). See also Braden, supra note 1, at 729.
143. First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1120 (3d Cir.
1984).
144. See, e.g., Klicker, 563 F.2d at 1312 (citing Hughes Air Corp., CAB Order No.
74-12-124, 40 Fed. Reg. 1121, 1122 n.5 (1975), for the holding that a tariff which exempts
an airline from liability for negligence is against public policy and void).
145. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 41504(a) (1995). See also 14 C.F.R. § 221.3(a) (1995)
(requiring airlines to file tariffs).
146. First Pennsylvania Bank, 731 F.2d at 1120 (noting that the CAB no longer has
primary jurisdiction in validity of tariff cases). The elimination of CAB's jurisdiction
"merely eliminated the need to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the
judicial remedies at common law." Id. at 1121.
147. 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990). The lower court reported the underlying case as
"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc." Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1476 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Transworld 1]. For
consistency, this Note will follow the Ninth Circuit and refer to the plaintiff as
"Transworld," not "Trans World."
148. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc., 913 F.2d 676,
680-81 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Transworld II]. While the variety of allegations,
ranging from fraud to antitrust, complicated the jurisdiction issue, the court considered the
determination of the legal efi et of a federal tariff restricting the transfer of awards to be
an independent matter of federal jurisdiction. Id.
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broker in frequent flyer award tickets.'49 Specifically, the court
focused on whether an inalienability clause within the FFP rules was
against public policy. 50 The Ninth Circuit found that the FFP inalien-
ability or "no-sale" rule was both a properly filed tariff and a part of the
FFP's program rules.' 5'
The circuit court began its analysis in agreement with the court
below.1'5 The Ninth Circuit noted that deregulation of the airline
industry had no effect on the legal force of a properly filed tariff.53
The court further noted that federal regulations continued to require the
airlines to file tariffs54 and also continued to prohibit the airlines from
forming contracts inconsistent with their published tariffs.'55 The court
thus concluded that because deregulation did not alter the legal force of
a validly filed tariff, courts should continue to read the tariffs strictly and
narrowly. 56 The court stated that, "[A] tariff.., is not a mere con-
tract. It is the law."' 57
149. Id. at 679. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of
frequent flyer award ticket brokers. The broker filed a counterclaim alleging tortious
interference with business relations and antitrust violations. Transworld 11, 913 F.2d at
678, 697-98.
150. Id. at 685.
151. Id. at 689. The airline filed the rules with the DOT pursuant to 14 C.F.R.
§ 221.3 (1982). Transworld If, 913 F.2d, at 678. After this case, the DOT clarified that
airlines do not need to file their general program rules. They must, however, file FFP-
award-redemption rates as a fare tariff. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the DOT's order and its ramifications.
152. Transworld I1, 913 F.2d at 681.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also 14 C.F.R. § 221.3(a) (1995) (stating that a carrier has a duty to file
tariffs).
155. Transworld1I, 913 F.2d at 681 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 221.3(b), which provides that,
"[n]o air carrier... shall ... receive a greater or less or different compensation for air
transportation or for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares and charges
specified in its currently effective tariffs"). The court assumed that the DOT required
airlines to file all their FFP program rules as tariffs. See Transworld I, 682 F. Supp. at
1476.
156. Transworld 11, 913 F.2d at 681.
157. Id. (quoting Carter v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 365 F.2d 486, 496
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967)). But see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381(b)
(1988) (allowing airlines to "incorporate by reference in any ticket or other written
instrument any of the terms of the contract of carriage" to the extent authorized by the
DOT and consistent with the filed tariff).
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Having agreed with the district court on these basic issues, the Ninth
Circuit turned to address the greater question in a fundamentally different
way.5 s The Ninth Circuit first noted that the lower court began its
discussion with the assumption that the frequent flyer award tickets were
property; thus, the policy against restraints on alienation applied.'59
The circuit court challenged this assumption and asserted that the award
tickets were not "property," but rather "rights of contract.' 160  Conse-
quently, the presumption against inalienability restraints did not apply
and no investigation into the tariff's validity was necessary. 6'
The Ninth Circuit did not investigate whether these restraints, as
contractual limitations, were reasonable.162  It noted that within the
realm of contract law there is a public policy against agreements that
unreasonably restrain trade. 63  However, the Ninth Circuit did not
delve into whether this unreasonableness theory would suffice to make
the no-sale clause invalid, because the parties had neither raised nor
argued it.' 6 The court thus concluded its analysis and held that,
158. 913 F.2d at 685-89. The Ninth Circuit first dismissed the district court's finding
that the restraints were reasonable. Id. at 685. The circuit court held that the district court
lacked the factual development necessary to make the conclusion, as a matter of law, that
the no-sale restraints were reasonable. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, proceeded to
affirm the lower court's ruling on different grounds. 1d. (citing Fidelity Fin. Corp. v.
Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1064 (1987)).
The court theorized that the FFP had to balance the cost of the awards against the
marketing benefit of the program. The court found that if the restraint on alienation were
removed, the value of the award tickets would differ from the value on which the airline
based its original cost-benefit calculation. Thus, the court held that the airline had
reasonable justification for the restraint. 913 F.2d at 685.
159. Transworld11, 913 F.2d at 682, 685 (citing Transworldl, 682 F. Supp. at 1481).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.1(1) (1983) (noting that the common
law of property condemns disabling restraints on donative transfers for any period of time).
160. Transworld Il, 913 F.2d at 688-89. The court analogized to old discount railroad
tickets and found that the award tickets were more appropriately categorized as "contracts."
Id. at 686 (citing Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 207 U.S. 205 (1907) (holding
that non-transferable discount railroad tickets were contracts; thus restraints against
alienation were not repugnant to public policy)).
161. Id. at 688.
162. Id. at 689.
163. Id. (noting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-188 (1981) (stating
a general public-policy argument against contracts that directly or unreasonably restrain
trade)).
164. Id. Some commentators have severely criticized the court's unwillingness to rule
on the validity of the contractual inalienability. See Klingaman, supra note 3, at 338 ("By
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because the instruments at issue were contractual in nature, the airline's
tariff was not a per se violation of public policy.'65 The airline was
free to enforce its tariffs against holders of brokered award tickets.'66
Courts subsequently faced with this issue have followed the Ninth
Circuit's decision and rationale. 67 However, the DOT, as the regulat-
ing agency, mooted a large portion of Transworld in September
1989.168 The DOT issued an order which stated that it would no
longer require the airlines to file FFP rules for approval as tariffs. 169
In effect, this order removed the program rules from classification as a
tariff and thus avoided its strict binding nature. 7° However, the DOT
still required the airlines to file, as a tariff, the rates at which consumers
deciding the case in that manner, the court avoided the question of whether or not the
restrictions on transferability are 'reasonable.' It is uncertain whether another hearing on
this issue before a different tribunal would follow this hollow precedent."). However,
subsequent courts have completed the analysis left unfinished in Transworld 17 and have
ruled that the restraints, as contractual limitations, are not against public policy. See
American Airlines, Inc. v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410,414-15 (10th Cir. 1992) (examining
the reasonableness of a no-sale rule as a contractual limitation and finding no violation of
public policy).
165. Transworld1, 913 F.2d at 689.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Christensen, 967 F.2d at 415 (citing Transworld 11 favorably and also
ruling on the validity of the tariff as contractual restraint).
168. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Platinum World Travel, 737 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D.
Utah 1990) (modifying earlier decision in response to the DOT's clarification), modifying
717 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Utah 1989), aff'd 769 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Utah 1990), aff'd sub
nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992). See also
DOT Order 9/13/89, supra note 97. Though the DOT issued the order in September,
1989, the first case to recognize its impact was not confirmed until 1992. Christensen, 967
F.2d at 418.
169. DOT Order 9/13/89, supra note 97, at *1.
170. Platinum World Travel, 737 F. Supp. at 628. Airlines are required to file "all
rates, fares, and charges for air transportation," but this is limited to the "rules, regulations,
practices, and services" required by the DOT's regulations. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373(a)
(1988) (emphasis added). Because the DOT does not require airlines to file FFP rules, the
rules remain part of a private contract between the carrier and passenger. See DOT Order
9/13/89, supra note 97, at *2. The DOT's primary rationale for not requiring airlines to
file rules as a tariff was that FFPs are "broad based marketing programs which extend far
beyond air transportation." Id. This rationale, promoted by the airline, seems to contradict
the finding in Wolens that FFPs are closely related to "air rates and service." See supra
note 97 and accompanying text (noting airlines' belief that FFPs are closely related to air
rates and services). Because FFPs are not filed as tariffs, determining the validity of the
"program rules" falls to the states.
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may "buy" FFP awards with their accumulated miles.' Therefore, as
a federal tariff concerning interstate air rates, the cost of FFP awards in
FFP miles remains a justiciable federal issue. Transworld's rationale
remains applicable for this smaller issue.
For current FFP members upset with program changes, Transworld
and the DOT order leave a small area within federal law for a suit based
on an airline's tariff. While consumers may no longer challenge the
propriety of specific program rules utilizing a tariff-based argument, they
may still challenge the reasonableness of the mileage cost of award
bonuses in this manner.
It does not appear that the courts will be amenable to these tariff-
based challenges. 72 However, if the issue ever arises in a context
distinct from the questionable business practices of the defendants in
Transworld73 and is combined with the mounting public outrage at
"devalued" credits, 74 the possibility of judicial activity increases.
V. THE SCOPE OF CONSUMER CLAIMS AGAINST FFPs IN
THE SHADOW OF WOLENS AND TRANSWORLD
A consumer feeling cheated by the recent changes to her FFP has
limited options. Because Congress 175 and the DOT 176 thus far have
171. See DOT Order 9/13/89, supra note 97, at *3.
172. See Transworld 11, 913 F.2d at 689 (refusing to find an inalienability clause
"unreasonable"); Christensen, 967 F.2d at 415 (holding in accordance with Transworld II);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Ticket Exchange, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 976, 978 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (basing its holding on Transworld).
173. The defendants in Transworld were coupon brokers found to be tortiously
interfering with the business relationship. Transworld 11, 913 F.2d at 689-93. According
to the court, the defendants' conduct, if not criminal, rose at least to the "unclean hands"
level. Id.
174. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
175. Congress also refused to control any part of FFPs. In 1987, a legislative proposal
by Senator Lautenberg added an amendment to the Airline Passenger Protection Act of
1987, S. 1485, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987), that prevented changes to FFPs that would
injure the value of members' credit. See 133 CONG. REc. S15,525 (1987). However, due
to pressure from the airline industry, Congress did not enact the legislation. See Perry
Flint, Fine Print Fares; Airline Advertising of Fares, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Oct. 1989, at
2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Congress subsequently dealt with the
issue in a peripheral and personal manner. In 1995, as part of the Contract with America
legislation, the Senate banned its members from using frequent-flyer credit earned on
official business for personal travel. However, the House refused to implement similar
rules. See Becky Beyers, Frequent-Flier Perks Divide Congress, USA TODAY, Jan. 20,
1995, at 2B.
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been unwilling to exert control over the programs, 77 a disgruntled
member is left to pursue immediate relief within the court system.'
While the litigation climate is not particularly receptive to these
challenges, small doors of opportunity remain open. Adhering to
principles discussed in Wolens, a party may bring a state-law contract
action.'79 In addition, a party may bring a federal-law tariff claim,
similar to the one approved in Transworld.80 Furthermore, these
claims may be brought simultaneously. Thus, the FFP member must first
decide which forum will be most sympathetic to consumer causes.'
s
176. See DOT Order 5/29/92, supra note 39 (discussing the DOT's refusal to use its
authority under deceptive practices rules to restrict changes to FFPs); DOT Order 9/13/89,
supra note 97 (discussing the DOT's refusal to require airlines to file program rules as part
of the tariff). Observers have criticized the DOT's unwillingness to act on behalf of
consumers and its tendency to bow to industry demands in this area. See Flint, supra
note 175, at 2.
177. The executive branch has also failed to provide controls. In 1993, the report
from the National Commission to Insure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, convened
by President Bill Clinton, did not contain recommendations on FFP legislation despite
early suggestions for such. See Airline Commission Begins Work, Two Weeks ofMeetings
Announced, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, May 24, 1993, at 98, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File (announcing FFPs as item to be reviewed); Airline Panel's
Recommendation Not Likely to Advance as One Bill, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES,
Sept. 10, 1993, at A-174, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (noting
disappointment by observers that the Commission failed to address FFPs in its report to
the President and recommended legislation).
178. Perhaps the most effective action a consumer may take is to switch to a carrier
offering a more lucrative plan. Because a number of carriers are not implementing all of
the 1995 changes, there is some indication that carriers may use FFP membership as a
means to compete. See Perkins, supra note 68, at TR-3 (noting that American WVest,
TWA, and Northwest are not changing their FFP award levels). However, the carriers
making the fewest changes in the rules are either in bankruptcy protection or are
immediately out of bankruptcy. Thus, a consumer may be forced to choose between a
stable carrier with a stingy program or an unstable carrier with a generous program. Id.
Among the larger carriers there are no significant differences in the FFP changes. Id.
Thus, a consumer has limited options to change to preferred carriers. Furthermore, most
members have miles in one program and the transaction cost of switching to a new
program would negate any advantage.
179. See supra notes 73-134 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's pre-
emption clause and various courts' treatment of state claims).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 135-74 (discussing various courts' treatment
of federal tariff claims).
181. A discussion of which forum may be the most advantageous to consumer claims
is beyond the scope of this Note. The appropriate choice of forum varies greatly with a
number of factors and is better predicted by local counsel.
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The FFP member must next consider, given the deregulation statutes
and court decisions, what claims still theoretically remain. The ADA
pre-emption clause,"8 2 interpreted in light of the policies behind
deregulation,"8 3 effectively limits any suit brought to retrospective
breach of contract actions. Claims which seek to limit future changes in
FFPs will not succeed in state or federal courts.
FFP members may initiate state contract claims.184  However,
because the state courts may not apply public policy arguments,'85 they
may only enforce the strict terms of the program rules. All FFP rules
contain a clause that reserves the airlines' right to change the program
at any time.86 Therefore, strict interpretation of this clause will most
likely defeat the majority of contract suits.
Federal courts may rule on the validity of an airline's tariff.87
However, because the DOT does not require FFPs to file program
rules, 8 the courts may not hear cases on the propriety of FFP program
rules. Nevertheless, the DOT does require the airlines to file the FFP-
award-redemption rates as tariffs189 and the courts may rule on the
validity of these tariffs.
The cumulative effect of deregulation and the subsequent FFP cases
is essentially to limit consumers to small retrospective suits that
challenge the validity of an airline's award-redemption-rate tariff.
VI. DEVALUATION OF FFP CREDIT IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
182. See supra notes 76-134 and accompanying text.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 (discussing the theoretical and historic
reasons for deregulating the airline industry).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 114-27 (discussing Wolens VII and the
Supreme Court's holding that allowed the case to proceed on the state contract claims).
185. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding
that the ADA's pre-emption clause prevents courts from applying state public-policy-based
arguments in interpreting FFP contracts). Furthermore, a number of other contractual
problems also exist that make these claims very problematic, despite the inability to use
public-policy-grounded interpretative tools. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
186. See supra text accompanying note 40.
187. See supra notes 135-74 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial review of
a tariff's propriety by the court system).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
189. See supra text accompanying note 171.
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FFPs represent sources of real value to both consumers and
airlines. 90 Consumers, in essence, buy "free" tickets by paying higher
standard fares and airlines obtain consumer loyalty for an otherwise
indistinguishable product. 9 ' FFP rules, as contracts, are adhesive in
nature: the weaker party is forced to accept the unseen terms, and the
stronger party reserves all the rights. 92 Retroactive changes to FFPs
unfairly devalue the credits that consumers have paid for and that the
airlines have agreed to give.' 93 This is not the reasonable expectation
of an FFP member, and thus, is unfair.
Furthermore, paying for a ticket with one's earned mileage differs
from paying for a ticket with cash. When using cash, a consumer holds
the money and can shop the competitive market. If an airline raises its
rates, the consumer may move to another carrier offering a lower price.
This is the essence of competition and represents the goal of airline
deregulation. However, when using FFP credit to "buy" a ticket, the
airline holds the "money" and the member can only shop at a single
store. Thus, if an airline raises its FFP award-redemption rates, the
consumer is forced to buy at the higher "price" or do without. In
essence, this is a monopoly and against the public policy of free markets.
Courts encountering lawsuits over changes to FFPs should base their
rulings on public policy. This would limit the cases courts could hear
because the Supreme Court has effectively pre-empted public-policy-
based state claims, and the DOT has narrowed the application of the
federal tariff system to FFPs. Thus, the courts may apply a public-policy
rationale only to federal claims against the validity of the airline's tariff
that governs the redemption rate of FFP awards. Changes which devalue
FFP member credits are repugnant to public policy, because they
frustrate members' reasonable expectations of the bargain, and do not
allow competitive forces to shape the market. Thus, courts should hold
that changes which depreciate the value of previously earned credits are
"unreasonable."
190. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the valuation of FFP
awards by the IRS and the courts in criminal trials and divorce settlements).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 35 (discussing the importance of FFPs
in the post-deregulation era as a means of differentiating products and establishing loyalty).
192. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing airlines' initial changes
that adversely impact consumers by diminishing the value of their miles and limiting the
availability of seats and flying dates).
193. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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Pursuant to this approach, airlines would still be allowed to change
their programs prospectively to ensure that their operations remain
competitive and profitable. Furthermore, passengers would be able to
enjoy that which they bargained and paid for. By following this course,
courts would protect consumers' real interest in FFPs while avoiding re-
regulating the industry and driving airlines into unprofitable ventures.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since 1978, Congress has taken a hands-off approach to the airline
industry and has passed what little power remains to the DOT. The
DOT, in turn, has refused to regulate FFPs directly '94 or indirectly.'95
Thus far, courts have handled FFP cases inconsistently. State courts may
enforce the strict terms of the FFP agreements, but are prohibited from
reading in any policy-based consumer-protection considerations. Federal
courts, fearing re-regulation, have exercised wide discretion and allowed
pure market forces to shape the contours of the airline industry.
After fifty years of tight federal regulation, Congress cut the airline
industry loose. The legislative, administrative, and judicial branches
have tried to make up for the years of close control by allowing
completely unchecked competition. One positive outgrowth of this era
was the development of frequent flyer programs, which allow airlines to
distinguish their services. However, the unrestrained competition has
also left many consumers unprotected in an overly competitive industry.
Now, nearly twenty years after deregulation, it is time to begin to protect
consumers again. By ruling against the validity of retrospective changes
to frequent flyer award levels, the federal courts can begin to realign the
balance between competition and consumers.
Kent Anderson*
194. See supra note 176 (noting the DOT's refusal to place direct controls on FFPs
through use of deceptive measures statutes).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70 (discussing the DOT Order clarifying
that airlines do not need to file FFP rules as tariffs).
* M.A./J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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